Introduction

Overview
Computability analysis of social choice is concerned with algorithmic properties of social decision-making. It aims at identifying which social choice rules can be algorithmically executed, and at determining how complex such rules are. This paper reconsiders Arrow's Impossibility Theorem [3] from a viewpoint of computability analysis of social choice.
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem states that there is no social welfare function that satisfies the Unanimity, the Independence and the Nondictatorship axioms. Here, a social welfare function maps each profile of individual preferences into a "social preference." The preferences are defined on a set of at least three (social) alternatives and there are no restrictions on the preferences beyond the usual ordering properties. Unanimity says that when all individuals prefer an alternative x to another alternative y, then society must "prefer" x to y. Independence means that the only information relevant for determining "social preference" on a set fx;yg is the individual preferences on the set. Nondictatorship rules out an individual such that whenever he prefers x to y, society must "prefer" x to y. Henceforth, I apply the word "preferences" and related expressions to society as well as to individuals without the quotation marks.
In this paper, I intend to study feasibility of centralized decision-making such as voting. I will interpret feasibility of executing a social choice rule by a central authority as algorithmic computability of the rule. This is in effect the same as regarding such an authority as an algorithm (or a digital computer) that computes the rule. Support for this comes from several sources. First, well-known schemes (for variable, finite number of voters), such as the simple majority rule, the unanimity rule, and the Condorcet and the Borda rules, are all algorithms. Noncomputable social choice rules cannot be carried out systematically no matter how well-specified. (Kelly [10] gives examples of noncomputable social choice rules.) Second, the use of the language by social choice theorists suggests that the social welfare functions they consider are in fact computable ones. For example, Arrow defined a social welfare function to be a "process or rule" which, for each profile of individual preferences, "states" a corresponding social preference [3, p. 23] , and called the function a "procedure" [3, p. 2] . Indeed, he later wrote [4, p. S398] in a slightly different context, "The next step in analysis, I would conjecture, is a more consistent assumption of computability in the formulation of economic hypotheses." Finally, there is a normative reason for supporting algorithmic computability. Algorithmic social choice rules specify the procedures in such a way that the same results will be obtained irrespective of who carries out a computation. They leave no room for personal judgments by the authority. In this sense, computability of social choice rules formalizes the notion of "due process."
However, social choice theory has not traditionally paid much attention to formal problems of computability. This is understandable, for computability of social welfare functions is automatically satisfied by assuming a fixed, finite set of alternatives and a fixed, finite set of individuals-a common assumption in the literature. Computability is satisfied since, in such cases, a finite table can be constructed expressing the function.
As a modification to Arrow's setting, I discard the finite framework. Fishburn [7] and Kirman and Sondermann [11] showed that when there are infinitely many individuals in a society, there is a social welfare function satisfying the axioms of Unanimity, Independence, and Nondictatorship. Armstrong [1, 2] proved that this result is unaffected even when profiles are restricted to those measurable with respect to a Boolean algebra of coalitions. Here, a profile is said to be measurable with respect to a Boolean algebra if for all alternatives x and y, the coalition that prefers x to y belongs to it.
I apply Armstrong's framework to a particular set of individuals and a particular Boolean algebra of coalitions suitable for considering computability, namely the set N of nonnegative integers and the Boolean algebra of all recursive coalitions. The recursive coalitions are the coalitions for which there is an algorithm to decide their membership. The domain restriction thus requires the members of a coalition to be algorithmically identifiable. We can name recursive coalitions using the Gödel numbers (codes) of these algorithms. We can then describe each measurable profile restricted on a set fx;yg by giving names to (i) the coalition that prefers x to y, (ii) the coalition that prefers y to x, and (iii) the coalition that is indifferent between x and y.
Suppose that a social welfare function for a denumerable (i.e., countably infinite) society satisfies Independence. The social welfare function satisfies Pairwise Computability if for each pair x; y of alternatives, there exists an algorithm that can decide, for each measurable profile of individual preferences and for each description of the profile on fx;yg, whether the society prefers x to y, from the description. I prove (Theorem 1) that if a social welfare function satisfying Unanimity and Independence also satisfies Pairwise Computability, then it must be dictatorial. A more desirable notion of computability ("Strong Pairwise Computability") for a social welfare function satisfying Independence could be introduced [15] ; however, the negative result of Theorem 1 implies that strengthening the condition of computability is not very interesting. On the other hand, the proof of Proposition 1 shows through examples that while there are some dictatorial social welfare functions that satisfy Pairwise Computability, not all do.
Pairwise Computability requires neither a finite set of alternatives, nor com-putable individual preferences. Also, the information necessary for computation is readily obtainable, being a description of a profile only on a set fx;yg. Theorem 1 severely limits on practical grounds Fishburn's resolution, re-establishing Arrow's negative result even for denumerable societies.
Since speaking of infinitely many people involved in social choice might seem unrealistic, I discuss a natural example of a denumerable "society" derived from only finitely many people. The example does not assume people extending into the indefinite future. I postpone a concrete example to Section 2.1.3 and give an abstract version here.
Consider a social choice problem in which there are finitely many people and there is uncertainty expressed by a denumerable set of states of the world. Assume that it cannot be known which state will be realized by the time social choice is made. Then, it is reasonable to suppose that people express their preferences conditioned on states: "person j prefers social alternative x to y if the state is s"-which is denoted by x s j y. A denumerable "society" is derived from the society of people facing uncertainty as follows. Regard person j's preference s j in state s as the preference j;s of the newly named individual j; s. Since there are only finitely many people and denumerably many states, we have a denumerable set of individuals j; s. This derivation of an infinite "society" as well as the domain restrictions might seem artificial. However, they are in fact natural and even have some advantages. First, inter-state comparisons are avoided, in the same sense that inter-personal comparisons are avoided in Arrow's setting. Second, in this formulation, people can express their preferences without estimating probabilities. Third, the domain restriction requires, for example, that each person can identify (in a finite way) the set fs : x s j y g of states in which he prefers x to y, for each x and y. This is a natural epistemological condition since, instead of having to make infinitely many statements (whether x s j y for infinitely many s) without any recognizable pattern among the statements, he does have a finite rule that can make those infinitely many statements.
Hayek [9] points out that economic data, or knowledge, is dispersed: assuming data to be given to a single mind is a trivialization of social problems. This paper gives an example of a "trivialized" problem that is impossible to solve nevertheless once feasibility of information processing is formally required. In this sense, the paper strengthens Hayek's thesis about the difficulty of informationally centralized decision-making.
The negative result (Theorem 1) suggests relaxing the notion of Pairwise Computability to see if the resulting condition can be met by a social welfare function satisfying Arrow's axioms. A positive result, using oracle Turing programs, is dis-cussed in my dissertation [15] . (In a paper [17] attempting to avoid the GibbardSatterthwaite impossibility, I use the essence of the proof of the positive result to construct a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function.)
The paper is organized as follows. The rest of the Introduction surveys the related literature. The main results are stated in Section 3, which is preceded by informal discussion in Section 2. Section 3 assumes a few terminologies in Appendix B on recursion theory (the study of algorithms). Appendix A discusses two notions of computability not covered in the main body. The proofs of the main results are given in Appendix C, where the knowledge of recursion theory covered in Appendix B is assumed.
Related Literature
The modern paradigm of social choice theory began with Arrow's Impossibility Theorem [3] in 1951. Surveys (e.g., Sen [19] ) of later developments in social choice reveal that issues relating to computability in social choice have largely been ignored. This lack of interest is surprising, given that social choice theory has had a significant impact on philosophy and economics [8] : Philosophers have been concerned about algorithmic computability in their study of logical reasoning processes; economists have witnessed [12] the socialist calculation debate among Mises, Hayek [9] , Lange, and Lerner.
Algorithmic (Turing) computability has been studied in the related areas by Canning [5] in game theory, by Spear [21] on learning rational expectations, by Wong [22] in general equilibrium theory, and by Lewis [13] in individual choice theory.
In social choice theory, computability is studied from the recursion theoretic point of view by the following authors.
Kelly [10] considers computability of variable-voter social choice rules. He is interested in finding a noncomputable rule satisfying a subset of axioms characterizing the simple majority rule (which is computable), since he wants to see which properties of the rule lead to computability.
The paper most closely related with the present study is Lewis [14] , which is motivated by constructive mathematics. It discusses Arrow's Theorem "within the recursion theoretic setting." Although the set of individuals he considers is the same as mine (the set of natural numbers), our frameworks are different:(i) the set of alternatives in Lewis is a countable set that contains at least three elements, while my set of alternatives can be uncountable; (ii) his set of preferences is countable, while mine can be uncountable; (iii) Lewis restricts profiles to be recursive (i.e., there is an algorithm to determine for each individual and each pair of alternatives, his preference on the pair)-such profiles form a strict subclass of my REC-measurable profiles to be defined later; (iv) Lewis assumes that coalitions are recursively enumerable, while in my framework each coalition that prefers one alternative to another is recursive. Lewis states that in his "recursive" setting, there is a "dictator." But, in his theorems, he is using the word "dictator" in a much weaker sense than mine: in essence, he claims that for each profile, there is a "dictator" whose preference determines the social preference for that particular profile; by contrast, I prove existence of a single dictator for all profiles. (Although he presents the result without referring to the Unanimity or the Independence axioms, I suppose it is an oversight.)
Discussion
This Section is an informal exposition of the framework and the results in Section 3.
In the rest of the paper, I informally use the word person (people) to refer to a person in the ordinary sense, a human being. The word individual is used in a technical sense. An individual may be either a person or a name representing a person at a certain date or state.
Domain Restrictions
In this Section, I introduce for a social welfare function a domain suitable for consideration of computability issues in the setting of Arrow's Theorem. The treatment is based on Armstrong's extensions [1] of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem [3] and of Fishburn's resolution [7] .
Naming Individuals
Since Arrow's impossibility persists for any finite set of individuals (a corollary of Proposition 2 in Appendix C), I consider as a set I of (the names of) individuals one of the simplest infinite sets, namely the set N of nonnegative integers. A denumerable set of individuals arises naturally in social choice.
For example, a denumerable set of individuals may arise when a national government is evaluating alternative policies that can affect future generations. We can, for example, assign a name to each person as follows: if a person is a female, she is given a name starting from a nonzero even number; otherwise, an odd number. Likewise, economic, social, political classifications can be coded into a name.
Another example of a denumerable set of individuals is given by the case of finitely many people facing a set X of alternatives and uncertainty expressed by a denumerable set S of states of the world. This was discussed in the Introduction.
Coalitions
I assume that only some coalitions (sets of individuals) are observable. Intuitively, the observations are made by an agent, called a social planner, a human or machine that executes a social welfare function. Since an observation is a cognitive activity, it seems natural to introduce a structure for observable coalitions. Following Armstrong [1] , I require that the family of observable coalitions form a Boolean algebra. Namely, if two coalitions are observable so must be their union, intersection, and complements. For instance, (i) the family of all subsets of I = N and (ii) the family of all finite sets and cofinite sets (i.e., the complements of a finite set) of I = N, each forms a Boolean algebra.
Since I am concerned with algorithmic computability, I restrict coalitions to those which can be recognized by some algorithm. Then, we will see that (i) becomes too broad a family, being uncountable, while (ii) is unnecessarily restrictive, excluding the intuitively "describable" coalition of even numbers, for example. The observable coalitions that I propose are the recursive sets of individuals. These are the coalitions whose membership is effectively decidable, i.e., the ones for which there is an algorithm that can decide for each name i, whether individual i is in the coalition. The algorithmically decidable nature of recursive coalitions seems to capture the idea of what we mean by a coalition that is "observable" or "recognizable" or "identifiable." The recursive coalitions form a Boolean algebra.
Social Welfare Functions
A social welfare function (formally, an REC-social welfare function) maps a profile
(on a set X of alternatives) to a social preference p . I assume that the set I of individuals is N, and that the domain includes all those profiles p such that for any x and y, the coalition fi : x p i y g that prefers x to y is recursive. Such profiles are called measurable (with respect to the Boolean algebra REC of recursive coalitions). Measurable profiles are understood to be the ones for which the social planner will be required to give a social preference.
Remark. The measurability condition might appear unreasonable since it implies that the preferences of different individuals are correlated in some way. To defend the condition, I give two interpretations. The first is given by the uncertainty example in the Introduction, where there are only finitely many people facing denumerably many states. In this case, the measurability condition simply reflects the reasonable epistemological requirement that each person can identify the set of states in which he prefers an alternative to another alternative. The second interpretation is when a society is made up of infinitely many people extending into the indefinite future. In this case, it is reasonable to suppose that we are dealing with imagined preferences rather than actual preferences. The measurability condition reflects the reasonable requirement that what is imagined should be describable. } Example. Suppose that the Administration of Food, Drug, Cosmetics, and Medical Devices (FDCA) is to adopt a usage policy for a newly developed medicine. The FDCA consults some selected set of people, or "experts" about their preferences among alternatives policies such as "prescription only" or "experimental use only on nonhumans." These policies form the set X of alternatives. The experts are not comfortable with giving definite answers since the medicine is new and so there are uncertainties that cannot be resolved by the time a policy has to be adopted. So, the FDCA decides to specify conditions on which experts may base their opinions. These conditions constitute the set of states of the world that may involve with, for example, (i) the potential benefits s 1 of research for the next dozen years in case only experimental use is allowed or (ii) the cost s 2 in terms of human lives for the next decade in case a unrestrictive policy is adopted. Each state s specifies a value to these variables s 1 and s 2 , among others. It is natural to assume that the set S of states is denumerable. The discussion of finitely many people facing uncertainty (Section 1.1) applies to this example. }
Computability
Proposition 3 in Appendix C implies that if the set I of individuals is N and a social planner only observes measurable profiles (with respect to REC, the Boolean algebra of recursive coalitions), then a social welfare function (not necessarily computable) exists that satisfies Arrow's conditions. In this section, I introduce a modest condition for computability of social welfare functions and consider whether there is a computable social welfare function satisfying Arrow's axioms.
Naming Restricted Profiles
My notion of computability will be weak in the sense that they are only local requirements: they are concerned about how to obtain, for each pair x; y, the social preference on x; y from a description of a profile restricted to the set fx;yg. [15] .) Note that the computability condition implies that the value given by a deciding algorithm must be invariant over different e that represent the same profile at x; y. Also, note that PC does not require that a single algorithm work for all pairs.
The main result, Theorem 1, states that if a social welfare function satisfying Unanimity and Independence also satisfies PC, then it must be dictatorial. 1 The Introduction interprets this result as strengthening both Arrow's Theorem and Hayek's thesis.
On the other hand, Proposition 1 shows that while there are some dictatorial social welfare functions that satisfy PC, not all do. Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions (where social preference is always identical with the dictator's preference) are examples that do satisfy (Strong) PC.
Theorem
Framework
I is a set of individuals, which is either finite or infinite. An example of I is the set N of nonnegative integers. X is a set of alternatives, which has at least three elements.
P is the set of (strict) preferences, i.e., asymmetric and negatively transitive binary relations on X . 
Computability
I will define computability for social welfare functions using Turing computability. Turing computability is (one of several equivalents of) the generally accepted formalization of the intuitive notion of algorithmic computability. Informally, an algorithm is a finite list of instructions that, given a symbolic input, yields after a finite number of steps a symbolic output. According to this intuition, a computation by an algorithm is exact, deterministic and performed in a discrete manner; inputs and outputs are finitely describable (equivalently, describable by natural numbers); and so on [18, pp. 1-5] . Turing computability meets all these intuitive requirements.
The basic idea of a social welfare function is that it maps each profile p to a social preference p . So, when one accepts Turing computability, the first approach that one might attempt in introducing a condition of computability for social welfare functions is to represent profiles p and social preferences by integers, and then, to define computability in terms of these integers. This approach is unsatisfactory in general (for example, it is problematic even when I restrict attention to RECsocial welfare functions) unless X is finite. The reason is that when X is infinite, the domain of a social welfare function is not necessarily countable (e.g., P N REC is uncountable [15] ), while only countably many profiles p can be represented by a natural number. This implies a possibility that any algorithm used for obtaining social preferences fails to compute an output for "almost all" profiles in the domain. One way out of this problem would be to consider only countable domains for social welfare functions.
However, there is a different solution, which does not require countable domains. To describe the solution, I henceforth let the set I of individuals be the set N of nonnegative integers and I let the Boolean algebra B of coalitions be REC, the Boolean algebra of recursive sets. (So, I am considering only REC-social welfare functions :P N REC ! P .)
A key assumption that I make for my solution is the Independence axiom: I suppose that is an REC-social welfare function satisfying Independence. Corresponding to each profile p is the social preference p , which determines for each pair x; y of alternatives, whether x p y or not. By Independence, all that is needed to determine that, is the restriction of profile p to fx;yg. The Definition below introduces a method of representing such restricted profiles by a natural number e. Such representation (by integers) enables me to apply the notion of Turing computability. The notion of computability for social welfare functions will be introduced afterward.
Remark.
Restricting my attention to REC-social welfare functions satisfying Independence is reasonable since my main purpose is to determine whether there is a nondictatorial social welfare function among those satisfying Unanimity and Independence. Furthermore, the Independence axiom can be regarded as a part of the computability condition. After all, Independence is a stringent form of an informational viability condition, which requires finiteness in some aspects of information to be processed. } A characteristic index for a recursive set A is the Gödel number (name) of an algorithm computing the characteristic function for A. When a characteristic index for A is known, one can effectively recover the algorithm from the index; using this algorithm, one can decide, for any number e 1 2 N, whether e 1 is in A. Recall from Appendix B that e = he 1 ; e 2 ; e 3 i is the coding (by integer) of a triple e 1 ; e 2 ; e 3 of integers.
To describe the restriction of a measurable profile p on a pair fx;yg, I first describe each of fi : x Obviously, "=)" in (a) above can be replaced by " () ." But notice that e is restricted to those representing some p 2 P N REC at x; y. Remark. In order to appreciate the above notion, it is instructive to consider several other notions of computability. I give two alternative notions of computability in Appendix A. } I now give the main theorem, whose proof appears in Appendix C. It reestablishes Arrow's negative result even for denumerable societies.
Theorem 1 Let :P N REC ! P be an REC-social welfare function satisfying Unanimity and Independence. Then is dictatorial if it satisfies Pairwise Computability.
While Theorem 1 asserts necessity of dictatorship for computability, the next proposition shows that it is not sufficient. REC into a binary relation p on X as follows: for p 2 P N REC , and for x, y 2 X,
It can be shown [2, 16] that is a dictatorial REC-social welfare function satisfying Unanimity and Independence. The proof that does not satisfy Pairwise Computability appears in Appendix C. }
A Strengthening Pairwise Computability
A minor problem with the definition of Pairwise Computability occurs when an input number e for a deciding algorithm (for a partial recursive function γ in (a) in PC) for a social welfare function is illegitimate, so that it does not represent any measurable profile at the pair. In this case, application of the algorithm might give a social preference on x; y improperly. This problem is minor since I can safely think of a scenario in which a planner only processes inputs whose legitimacy she can prove. While there is no algorithmic procedure to give a proof of legitimacy for every input, there is no inconsistency in assuming that only numbers for which legitimacy can be proved are input to the social welfare function.
Having said that, let me consider some ways of avoiding obtaining social preferences for illegitimate inputs, for a planner might incorrectly believe that her input is legitimate. Computability A below requires illegitimate inputs to be indicated by a certain output; Computability B requires that outputs are given only for legitimate inputs. Though these notions may be appealing on intuitive grounds, they are both stronger than Pairwise Computability, and therefore, the main Theorem 1 applies a fortiori. However, I show here that no social welfare function satisfying Independence meets either of these computability conditions. These impossibility results further justify the use of PC (or Strong PC) as a notion of computability.
Suppose in the following that :P N REC ! P is an REC-social welfare function satisfying Independence.
1. In the definition of Pairwise Computability, it is required that an algorithm exist that can decide the restricted social preference given a representation e of a profile at a pair of alternatives. However, there is no requirement as to what the algorithm should do for an integer e 2 N that is illegitimate (i.e., that does not represent any REC-measurable profile at the pair). It would be desirable if the algorithm could decide for each integer e whether e is legitimate or not, in addition to deciding the restricted social preference. This leads to the following definition:
Computability A For each pair x; y 2 X 2 , there is a recursive function γ such that the condition (a) in Pairwise Computability is satisfied, and (b) for each integer e 2 N, if e does not represent any p 2 P N REC at x; y, then γe = 2.
Unfortunately, Computability A cannot be met by any REC-social welfare function that satisfies Independence. To see why, fix x; y and suppose a recursive γ satisfies (a) and (b). Then it must be that S = fe : γe = 1 or 0g is r.e. (in fact, recursive). This is because S is the domain of the partial recursive function γ 0 which is defined by γ 0 e = γ e iff γe = 1 or 0, and γ 0 e " iff γe = 2. (That γ 0 becomes partial recursive is straightforward from the Graph Theorem.) However, Lemma 3 in Appendix C shows that S = fe : e represents some p 2 P N REC at x; y g is not r.e.
2. One of the most obvious conditions of computability that one might think of is the following. It requires existence of a deciding algorithm (for the restricted social preferences) that gives an output only for legitimate representations of a profile at a pair.
Computability B For each pair x; y 2 X 2 , there is a partial recursive function γ such that the condition (a) in Pairwise Computability is satisfied, and (c) for each integer e 2 N, if e does not represent any p 2 P N REC at x; y, then γe ".
The same argument (that S is not r.e.) shows that no REC-social welfare function that satisfies Independence can satisfy Computability B.
B Recursion Theory
This appendix reviews the definitions and results from recursion theory necessary for understanding technical sections of the present paper. I mostly follow the nota-tions and terminologies in Soare [20] . Other references on recursion theory include Rogers [18] and Davis and Weyuker [6] .
In this appendix, x, y and z denote nonnegative integers. For sets A and B, A denotes the complement of A; A B denotes the set theoretic difference A \B.
B.1 Partial Functions
A partial function on N n , where n 1 is an integer, is a function (into natural numbers) whose domain is a subset of N n . If the domain of a partial function on N n is N n , then it is called total. For partial functions φ and θ, φx # denotes that φx is defined; φx " denotes that φx is undefined; φ = θ denotes that for all x, φx # iff θx #, and if φx # then φx = θ x ; dom φ denotes the domain of φ.
B.2 Algorithms
Informally, an algorithm (for a partial function φ on N) is a finite list of instructions that, given an input x, yields an output y = φx after a finite number of steps if φx is defined. (It should not yield an output if φx is undefined.) The algorithm must specify how to obtain each step in the computation from the previous steps and from the input. Informally, if a partial function is computed by an algorithm, it is called partial recursive.
We accept Church's Thesis which identifies the informal class of algorithmically computable partial functions with the class of partial functions computed by a Turing program. Turing programs can be defined precisely, but we do not do that here. For our purpose, it suffices to know that we can list all Turing programs in such a way that for any program we can algorithmically find its place (the code number) in the list and conversely. We choose one such algorithmic listing (or coding or Gödel numbering) and fix it.
B.3 Computability Theory
Code (Gödel number) all Turing programs. For e 2 N, let ϕ The Graph Theorem states [20, p. 29 ] that a partial function is partial recursive iff its graph is r.e.
We let hx;yi denote the image of x; y under the standard pairing function x 2 + 2xy + y 2 + 3x + y=2, which is a one-to-one recursive function from N N onto N. Let hx;y;zi denote hhx;yi;zi.
B.4 Lemmas
The following two lemmas will be used in the proofs of Theorem 1 and of Proposition 1.
Lemma 1 There is a one-to-one recursive function r such that for all e and u,
ϕ re u = 8 < :
1 if ϕ e u = 0, 0 if ϕ e u # and ϕ e u 6 = 0, " if ϕ e u ".
(1)
In particular, if e is a characteristic index for a set A, then re is a characteristic index for its complement A.
Proof. The right hand side is equal to ψe; u = 1 ϕ e u , where is the limited subtraction. Since the limited subtraction is recursive, ψ is partial recursive by the Enumeration Theorem. Then by the Parameter Theorem, there is a one-toone recursive function r such such that ϕ re u = ψ e ; u . 
C Proofs
In this Appendix, we prove Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 in Section 3.
The following Lemma is used in Appendix A and in the proof of Theorem 1. Let :P N REC ! P be an REC-social welfare function satisfying Unanimity and Independence. Given , let β be the partial function on N defined by β e 1 = 8 < :
Lemma 3 Let
1 if e 1 is a characteristic index for a recursive set in U , 0 if e 1 is a characteristic index for a recursive set not in U ,
" if e 1 is not a characteristic index for a recursive set, (3) where U denotes the ultrafilter in Proposition 2. Note that β is well-defined since each e 1 2 N can be a characteristic index for at most one set.
We define a computability condition for an REC-social welfare function satisfying Unanimity and Independence using the partial function β defined by ( otherwise.
Then, clearly, β 0 is an extension of β . Also, ϕ e i 0 is a partial recursive function of e by the Enumeration Theorem. Hence, β 0 is partial recursive.
((=). Let satisfy the hypothesis and suppose DDC is satisfied but is not dictatorial. In this case, the ultrafilter U corresponding to is free: it does not contain any finite sets. Let β 0 be an extension of β which is partial recursive. Note that β e = 1 if e is a characteristic index for a cofinite set since U is a free ultrafilter.
Let K = fe : e 2 W e g; K is a nonrecursive r.e. set. Since K is r. Now, the partial function ψ defined by ψe 1 = γ h e 1 ; r e 1 ; e 0 3 i is clearly partial recursive. By (4) , β e 1 = ψ e 1 for all e 1 2 CRec. Hence, the partial recursive function ψ is an extension of β . So, DDC is satisfied. By Lemma 4, it follows that is dictatorial.
Proof of Proposition 1. (Preliminaries for this proof begin after the proof of Lemma 3.) (i) Let be the social welfare function in Example 1. We show satisfies PC. Since is dictatorial, Lemma 4 implies that DDC is satisfied. So, there is a partial recursive function β 0 that extends β . Define a partial function γ by γhe 1 ; e 2 ; e 3 i = β 0 e 1 : Then, for any natural number e = he 1 ; e 2 ; e 3 i, γe = β 0 π e , where π:e 7 ! e 1 .
Since π and β 0 are partial recursive, γ is partial recursive.
We show that γ satisfies (a) in PC for all x; y. Fix x;y and suppose e = he 1 ; e 2 ; e 3 i represents a p at x; y. Then e 1 is a characteristic index for fi 2 N : We show that β 0 extends β, where:P N REC ! P is defined by Notice that U =Û.
Suppose e 1 is a characteristic index for a recursive set A inÛ. Then e = hge 1 ;e 0 We have shown that β has an extension β 0 that is partial recursive. This means that satisfies DDC, contradicting Lemma 4 since is not dictatorial.
